The league of unextraordinary gentlemen

Today it was widely reported that Asad's regime has rejected the Arab League's proposals to bring an end to the current violence in Syria. This does not come as a surprise. What comes as more of a surprise is that the Arab League were able to stir themselves into action sufficiently to reach a level of consensus and provide Asad with any form of proposal, considering the disagreements that have arisen between its members.

In a recent development, Saudi Arabia announced it was pulling out its representatives to the Arab League, citing Syria's inability to "keep its promises" as the main reason for exiting. (See Al Jazeera article.) With Al Jazeera reporting on Saudi's exit from the Arab League, some may think that this is a significant set back for the observer mission. The reality is quite different. Saudi's exit should not be seen as a significant step or otherwise, given how lacklustre the Arab League is as an international body.  

Despite, or perhaps in response, to Asad's rejection of the proposals the Arab League has decided it is necessary to continue their "observer mission", even though they have lost their Saudi delegate. And good for them, as observing is one thing the Arab League is good at. Unfortunately, it is converting these observations into meaningful action where precendent shows it fails.

I suspect that the House of Saud were hoping to cause a collective gasp by pulling out of this "observer mission". Yet, with the exception of the Al-Jazeera article mentioned above, the apparently dramatic move has gone largely unnoticed. However, the fact that Saudi has pulled out still deserves some criticism. Saudi Arabia likes to present itself as a leader of the Sunni Muslim Arab world, especially given the House of Saud's self-appointed role as Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques. Isn't it interesting that, despite taking on this role, they are still happy to walk out of an observer mission whose supposed purpose is to bring about an end to the violence at the hands of the Shia Asads against the very Sunni Muslims they claim to protect. Surely this forces us to question how seriously Saudi Arabia takes its international role? The House of Saud seems happy to accept the title, but flees at the first sign that action is required.  

I genuinely hope that the international community realise it is going to take more than this league of unextraodrinary gentlemen to resolve the situation in Syria. Observers they may be, leaders of action they are not. Syria needs the latter, desperately.

Yemeni immunity law leaves Saleh high and dry

I recently posted Tribulations but no trials for Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh to comment on the draft law which will grant Saleh and all his political associates immunity from prosecution following his exit from power.

Yesterday, as reported by the BBC (Yemen government 'amends Saleh immunity law') there has now been an interesting development.

Previously, an earlier draft of the law clearly stated that Saleh and all his political associates would be immune from prosecution following their exit from power. In this latest development, Saleh remains completely immune whilst his associates could now be called to the dock on corruption charges. For me, this suggests two things. First, the debate surrounding this particular law rumbles on and may continue to do so. Second, the fact that the debate is even taking place is strong evidence that Saleh's influence is weakening by the day, as the country awaits his departure.

Saleh's weakening power is leaving him in an increasingly vulnerable position. According to this latest draft of the law, he is now the only political figure in the country that cannot be tried on corruptoin charges. By exposing his former political associates to such charges he has cut himself off from those formerly loyal to him, thereby making his post-presidential position yet more precarious, particularly if he is unable to find another country to host him for the duration of his retirement.

Watch this space. I somehow think this will not be the only re-drafting of the controversial law. Saleh is clinging on to whatever he can somewhat desperately to protect himself from being thrown to the lions once he quits the presidency. But now, with none of his aides sharing in his post-presidential privileges, he may not even be able to rely on those most loyal to him to protect him from the wrath of his true enemies.

Egyptian real estate is a risky business for Kuwait

On 15 January 2012, the Kuwait Times ran a headline which read: Kuwaitis urged to invest in Egypt real estate market. The article reports on the Eighth Egyptian Real Estate and Investment Exhibition which took place in Kuwait from 11 - 15 January 2012.

During the exhibition, the Egyptian Ambassador to Kuwait, Abdulkareem Sulaiman, urged Kuwaitis to invest in Egyptian real estate, stating that: "The importance of [...the Egyptian real estate] sector lies in its connection with many other supplying industries such as  metal, cement, sand, ceramic, wood, electricity, and others. This means that the real estate sector can  power many other economic sectors related to it." He then went on to say "After the revolution, small spaces were freed up in up market areas. Some plots  there start at 90 meters; it was never available before."

I'm sure that both of Sulaiman's comments are valid, but there is a major flaw in his sales pitch. Yes, the ambassador eloquently educates his Kuwaiti audience as to the direct and indirect benefits of increased investment into their real estate market, but crucially he fails to mention why the Kuwaitis may want to invest in Egypt. Perhaps this is because benefits in Egyptian real estate investments for Kuwaiti (or any) investors are few and far between. In fact, far from being mutually beneficial, I see any arrangement here as a win-lose situation: win for the Egyptians - lose for the Kuwaitis.

My reason for concern here is simple and a quick run down the recent Egyptian headlines helps to explain why:

• Fox News: Egypt’s transition into democracy grows messier
• AFP: Petrol shortages trigger tension in Egypt
• Newsday: Egypt's military steps up battle with activists

All three of the above headlines point to the fact that, despite their relatively bloodless revolution which brought an end to the 30 year rule of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is still in a period of significant instability. But for me, the headline which provides the best summary as to why Egypt is not a good place for Kuwaitis to invest in real estate was posted on the ABC news website. It read: Egypt: where to from here? In short, post-revolution Egypt is yet to settle down, and the future remains very uncertain. At worst, the signs point to a prolonged period of further unrest. At best, Egypt can expect a slow road to stability, not least because the country is yet to go through a set of free elections, and Mubarak's trial provides a backdrop of uncertainty to any political developments. There are plenty of reasons here to deter potential Kuwaiti investors, even if they were tempted by the Egyptian Ambassador to Kuwait's speech, which I very much doubt.

As a former resident of Cairo, and lover of Egypt, I hope more than anyone that the country gets back on its feet as fast as possible. I also hope that Egypt will become an attractive place to invest in real estate but sadly I can't help feeling that the Egyptian Ambassador to Kuwait has got a little ahead of himself. I will watch with interest to see how many Kuwaitis take him up on the offer to relocate to the land of the Pharaohs. Let’s not hold our breath though…

Bahrain's activists are right to ask for more...within reason

On 15 January Al-Jazeera reported that the Bahraini King has proposed constitutional reforms which include:

“"new safeguards" to limit [the King’s] ability to dissolve the lower house of parliament. [...]The reforms would also require Khalifa to issue a "royal order" explaining the process for appointing members of the Shura Council, the 40-member upper house, which is entirely appointed by the king. Parliament would also play a larger role in determining the state budget.”

I have no doubt that the King’s announcement has come as a response to the prolonged unrest on the island kingdom and highlights that the Sunni Khalifa ruling family has run out of options for resisting the country’s shia majority anti government protesters. The announcement is a cause for celebration for Iran and a second consecutive victory for Iran over Saudi Arabia in the battle for dominance over Bahrain. (see Bahrain: the giants’ playground)

Al-Jazeera reports that, immediately following the announcement of reforms, Bahraini anti government protesters started grumbling that the reforms are merely “cosmetic”, are too minor and ultimately show that progress is too slow. The activists are right to demand more but they should also be reasonable. They should analyse the speed of Bahraini reforms in a Bahraini rather than a global context and in doing so they will see that the proposed reforms mark a move in the right direction by the island’s King.

In other words, Bahraini activists are right to ask for more but should adopt more realistic timelines. At this point, a couple of clichés spring to mind: Rome wasn’t built in a day and don’t run before you can walk, both of which are relevant to this situation. In fact, that Bahraini reforms are likely to constitute baby steps rather than giant leaps is no bad thing. Over-ambitious and over-hasty reforms are far more likely to result in a backlash after which the kingdom could become locked in a cycle of grand reforms followed by corrective measures to appease opponents of the change. Instead, if the activists adopt an approach of persistence coupled with patience we may just see them come out on top.

Politics or pity? Qatar calls for foreign troops to enter Syria

This evening I couldn't help noticing the Al-Jazeera headline Qatar's emir suggests sending troops to Syria

The article reports that the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani has spoken openly of sending troops to Syria to "stop the killing". I feel that this is hugely significant given that he is the first Middle Eastern leader to call directly for foreign intervention in Syria. His comment also contrasts greatly to the concerned but useless collective nods and huffing and puffing from the Arab League. Interеstingly, his call to arms is a general one, without indicating from where these troops should be sent. An offer of intervention by his own armed forces is notable in its absence, although perhaps it is too early to expect such a commitment.

Yet again, I can't help mentioning the overarching Sunni-Shia rivalry that contextualises the Emir's comment. The Al-Jazeera article states "a senior US official has accused Iran of aiding Assad's government". At this point I must refer back to a previous post on this blog which spoke of Iran's support of the Asad regime. Here I shall say it again: there is no doubt that Iran is aiding Asad's government and anyone who thinks otherwise is delusional. There is currently an increasing tide of anti-Iranian sentiment from inside the Middle East and further afield so for Iran to lose its Syrian Shia-government allies would be a mojor blow, not least beacuse Damascus is effectively an Iranian sateliite control centre for as long as Asad's regime remains in power.

Arguably Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani's call to arms is an attempt to capitalise on Iran's current vulnerability. A call for troops to intervene in Syria is essentially a call to hasten the inevitable end of Asad's regime. Given Syria's long-suppressed Sunni majority, it is highly unlikely that Shia leaders loyal to Iran will be able to fill the leadership position left vacant by Asad's exit. Instead, it is far more likely that Syria's first Sunni leadership will be sworn in.

However, putting political motivation aside, part of me feels that the Qatari Emir's call for military intervention in Syria may have come out of genuine concern for the Syrian people's plight. 

For now, regardless of whether it was politics or pity which motivated Sheikh Hamad to speak out, we should all watch with anticipation to see if anyone responds to his call to arms.

Oman: no news is good news

So far I have posted on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen. Following the Yemen post, my attention turned to its neighbouring country, Oman. I then went about searching for Omani current affairs as normal, but rather than having to sort through pages of google links, the search results were notable in their absence.

Is Oman the new land of milk and honey? Are the Omani streets paved with gold? Or maybe the government of Oman just has fantastic censors at work? One thing is for sure, a brief scout around the main international news agencies highlights that Oman is the least talked-about country in the Arabian Peninsula, and possibly throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

The following articles are the most significant articles I can find (feel free to add some more to the comments section if you can find any more up to date features).

Al Jazeera - February 27 2011, Deaths in Oman protests: At least two people killed in industrial town of Sohar as police clash with anti-government demonstrators

The BBC also reported on this on February 27 2011, Oman clashes: Two killed during protests in Gulf state 

France 24 - 25 September 2011, Oman to hold elections on October 15  (Incidentally, I could find nothing on the France24 website which reported on the actual outcome of the elections.)

CNN - November 17 2011, Oman puts women at forefront of Olympic ambitions

I find it interesting that the most recent news article featuring Oman in the international press was nearly 2 months ago. Perhaps I am a cynic, but I can't believe that Midas has high-fived the entire country. Where is the reality behind the golden facade?

If anyone can shed some light I'd love to hear their thoughts...

Tribulations but no trials for Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh

On Sunday 8 January, the interim Yemeni government approved a law which grants immunity from prosecution to outgoing Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his aides.

The law "provides Saleh, 69, and those who worked with him, including in civilian, military and security institutions during the period of his presidency, legal and judicial immunity" (Yemeni cabinet approves immunity law for Saleh, Al-Jazeera, 09 Jan 2012. See full article here.)

Saleh must surely be breathing a sigh of relief. Only last week his own people took to the streets of Sanaa, yet again, to demand their outgoing President face trial for overseeing the killing and harming of anti-government protesters during Yemen's recent and prolonged unrest. Considering that former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's trial rumbles on in Cairo, and remembering the outcome of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussien's trial, I imagine Saleh suffered a few sleepless nights as he pictured himself in the dock. His determination to avoid a similar fate appears to have paid off, at least in the short term.

Saleh may have avoided a trial, but his tribulations rumble on. I see nothing he can do to reverse the tide which is doggedly carrying him out of the presidential office and thanks to the complicated web of tribal divisons throughout Yemen, he will always have a steady supply of enemies from rival tribes. Previous Yemeni tribal conduct suggests that laws passed by any central government, let alone the current transitional cabinet, are loosly observed at best. If I were Saleh, I would be more concerned of meeting a similar fate to Gadaffi than of avoiding a trial. Perhaps this explains why Saleh put in a request for a US visa (allegedly to receive treatment for an undiscolsed health problem) but then lost interest in the visa request (see Washington post article here) after Washington stated that Saleh would only be allowed to stay in the US for the time required to complete any necessary medical treatment. It seems Saleh's search for the ideal retirement spot continues.  

Despite the recent law, I doubt Saleh's presidential exit will be as smooth as he would like, neither do I think he will stop looking for alternative locations to receive "medical treatment," or in other words, a safe retirement haven free from the sharp edge of a rival tribesman's jambiya.

Do you have a different idea about where Saleh may end up? If so, post your comments below.